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Using the subprime mortgage crisis as a shock, this paper shows 
that commercial borrowers served by more distressed banks (as 
measured by recent bank stock returns or the nonperforming loan 
ratio) took down fewer funds from precommitted, formal lines of 
credit. The credit constraints affected mainly smaller, riskier (by 
internal loan ratings), and shorter-relationship borrowers, and 
depended also on the lenders’ size, liquidity condition, 
capitalization position, and core deposit funding. The evidence 
suggests that credit lines provided only contingent and partial 
insurance during the crisis since bank conditions appeared to 
influence credit line utilization in the short term. It provides a new 
explanation as to why credit lines are not perfect substitutes for 
cash holdings for some (e.g. small) firms. Finally, loan level 
analyses show that more distressed banks charged higher credit 
spreads on newly negotiated loans but not on funds disbursed from 
precommitted, formal credit lines. Our analyses are based on 
commercial loan flow data from the confidential Survey of Terms 
of Business Lending (STBL). 
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Below a CFO explained why her company drew down $2 billion from its credit line in 
September and October 2008, “to enhance [its] cash position.” 
David M. Katz (CFO Magazine, Dec 16, 2008): Are you using the cash you’ve drawn 
from those credit lines? What’s the virtue in drawing down lines of credit and paying interest 
on debt you are using? 
Holly Koeppel (CFO of AEP, one of the nation’s biggest generators of electricity): 
That’s that negative carry. It’s nice to have money in the bank … 
Katz: But these were existing lines that you could have drawn down at any time. Was 
there some underlying worry about whether banks could deliver when you needed it? 
Koeppel: At the time of the first draw, no. After Lehman, I was not worried about our 
principal banking relationships, but I certainly felt more comfortable knowing that I had the 
money in the bank and we were very, very liquid. We’ve had very strong support from our 
bank group. We’re very grateful for their relationship and support. But I sleep better knowing 
that we have enough money in the bank. 
  
I. Introduction 
Why does a CFO need to worry about her company’s access to a legally binding 
bank line of credit? Maybe bank lines of credit are not as committed as they seem, and 
maybe there are times when a borrower needs to worry about a lender’s credit rating. 
Koeppel was not alone. Mark Shamber (CFO of United Natural Foods, which has a $400 
million credit facility with banks) reportedly “now carefully tracks the financial reports of 
the publicly traded members of his bank group.” 
A formal credit line (sometimes known as a revolving credit facility or a loan 
commitment) is a legally binding commitment for which a bank has charged a fee, which 
allows the borrower to take down funds at a certain spread over a base rate. Bank lines of 
credit and cash holdings are the two most popular liquidity management tools used by 
corporations (Lins, Servaes, and Tufano, 2007). Sufi (2007) finds that 85% of firms in his 
sample obtained a line of credit between 1996 and 2003, and the line of credit represents 
an average of 16% of book assets. In Lins et al.’s (2007) international sample, the median 
line of credit is equal to 15% of book assets, whereas cash holdings comprise only 9% 
(among which only 40% are not tied up for day-to-day operations). 
The theoretic literature considers lines of credit as committed liquidity insurance 
(Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1987; Berkovitch and Greenbaum, 1991; Duan and Yoon,   2
1993; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998; Morgan, 1994; Shockley, 1995; and Thakor, 2005). 
The literature also shows that depository banks have a natural advantage in providing 
liquidity under lines of credits (Kashyap, Stein, and Rajan, 2002; Gatev and Strahan, 
2006, 2008; Nini, 2008; Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan, 2009). 
However, the empirical literature on corporate cash holdings finds that firms, and 
in particular smaller firms, rely a lot on cash for liquidity management (Almeida, 
Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Faulkender and Wang 2006; Opler et al. 1999; Duchin, 
Ozbas, Sensoy, 2008), suggesting that lines of credit do not provide sufficient liquidity 
insurance for all firms. Sufi (2007) finds that banks provide credit lines that are 
contingent on maintenance of cash flow and that lines of credit are therefore a poor 
liquidity substitute for firms that have low existing or expected cash flows. 
In this paper we provide an additional explanation as to why bank lines of credit 
are contingent but not committed sources of liquidity insurance for certain types of firms. 
Specifically, we show that provision of credit in committed lines of credit is sensitive 
also to the banks’ own financial conditions.  
At first sight, precommitted credit lines provide committed insurance for 
borrowers because both credit limits and terms are set ex-ante and they are legally 
binding promises. However, we believe that banks can exploit at least two sources of 
bargaining power to influence credit line takedown volumes.  
The first source of power comes from financial covenants. Credit line facilities 
typically come with financial covenants (Bradley and Roberts, 2003; Chava and Roberts 
2007) to mitigate agency problems (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Berlin and Mester, 1992; 
Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). When a firm breaches a financial covenant, it triggers a 
“technical default.” Chava and Roberts (2007) find that about 15% of borrowers are in 
violation at any point in time and more than a third of borrowers are in violation at some 
point during their ten-year sample period. However, creditors typically renegotiate the 
contract, and covenant breaches rarely lead to default or acceleration of the loan 
(Gopalakrishnan and Parkash, 1995). Arguably, financial covenant violations may 
become even more common during an economic downturn when many borrowers’ sales 
and cash flows are negatively affected (but they are not necessarily distressed).    3
The second source of power comes from a “borrowing base” requirement. More 
than 80% of precommitted credit lines in our sample are secured, but not by real estate 
collateral. They are most likely credit facilities with a “borrowing base,” which is a 
lending formula that limits borrowings to a certain percentage of collateral, the most 
common being receivables and inventory. Banks reserve the right to regularly check the 
collateral, but they also have discretion over the frequency and rigor of auditing. 
Anecdotal reports in the media (CFO Magazine, May 19, 2009) suggest that, during the 
crisis, in particular when banks experienced their own capital and liquidity problems and 
were pressured by regulators, audits of borrowers’ working capital became more 
frequent, which often led to the reduction of loan capacity because many borrowers were 
sitting on inventories that had depreciated greatly in value.  
 Therefore, we hypothesize that a bank retains significant influence over credit 
line utilization because it has discretion over whether to waive the borrowers’ current or 
future compliance with financial covenants or the borrowing base requirement, and 
therefore credit lines provide only partial and contingent insurance for borrowers. A bank 
may not invoke the discretion when it is in good financial health. When needed, however, 
a bank can directly influence credit line takedown volumes by reducing credit availability 
to borrowers who are not in compliance with covenants or whose collateral (inventory 
and receivables) has declined in value. A threat of doing so (e.g., auditing collateral) can 
also persuade less urgent borrowers from withdrawing funds when the bank is in distress. 
We use the subprime mortgage crisis (prior to the direct injection of TARP money 
into bank equity) as a shock to conduct our tests, during which banks experienced severe 
deteriorations in financial health but the level of distress varied a lot across lenders and 
over time. We then study how the financial distress that originated in the residential real 
estate sector affected the new supply of loans to commercial and industrial borrowers 
(excluding any real estate loans).   
Our analyses are based on the confidential Survey of Terms of Business Lending 
(STBL) data collected by the Federal Reserve, which contain rich information (loan risk 
ratings, commitment status, etc.) on new commercial loans made by surveyed banks 
during the first business week of every February, May, August, and November. The data 
allow us to measure new loan flows, which most other data sets do not.    4
During the crisis, banks in distress, in order to preserve their own liquidity and 
capital, if they have the discretion, may have incentives not to honor all liquidity demand 
from borrowers (Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1993). In a panel of 120 banks over 7 
quarters, we empirically show that in more distressed banks (as measured by recent stock 
returns or the nonperforming loan ratio), pre-committed credit lines reported smaller 
takedown volumes. Further, we find that the impacts were concentrated on risky 
borrowers, smaller borrowers, and borrowers with shorter relationships with the banks. 
We also find that smaller, less liquid, less capitalized, and less retail-deposit-funded 
banks responded more strongly to their own conditions. The results on the importance of 
deposit funding are consistent with Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008). However, we also 
study smaller loans not available in the Dealscan database used in their study. 
Distinguishing between large and small borrowers provides important, new insights. 
Analyzing loan-level data, we also find that in response to the deterioration in 
their own financial health, banks raised interest rates on new term loans, loans from 
informal credit lines, and new formal credit lines, but not in precommitted formal credit 
lines, in which we observe declines in quantities instead.  
We are not the first to show that the loan volume from precommitted credit lines 
is surprisingly influenced also by supply-side factors. Berger and Udell’s (1992) study 
focuses on two “credit crunch” episodes (1978:2-1980:1, 1981:1-1981:4) and they also 
show that when credit markets are tight, loans disbursed from committed lines are 
rationed when the commitments should have contractually protected borrowers from 
rationing. Loan commitments may not be as committed as they seem. 
The evidence is inconsistent with the notion that formal credit lines provided 
committed insurance for borrowers, because takedown volumes in truly committed 
facilities should be affected only by borrowers’ conditions (such as cash flow as 
documented by Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey, 2009) and not the lenders’ 
conditions. The results provide a new explanation as to why bank credit lines are not 
perfect substitutes for cash, because access to credit lines is contingent on bank 
performance in addition to the borrower’s own creditworthiness. 
Our data and analyses have several key limitations. We do not have information 
on the identity of the borrowers and therefore are unable to control for industry and   5
accounting performance of the borrowers. We can only make inference about the size of 
the borrowers through the size of the credit line facility and about the riskiness of the 
borrowers through internal risk ratings of loans. Finally, while databases like Dealscan 
observe facilities’ initiations but not takedowns, we in contrast observe takedowns but do 
not have information on credit facilities that were not drawn upon during the survey 
weeks. To sum up, we do not know whether borrower demand may have driven the 
results. Similar to Kashyap and Stein (2000), we draw our conclusion based on the 
assumption that loan demand does not systematically correlate with variations in lender 
financial conditions, in particular when those variations originate from exposures in the 
residential mortgage sector, which are not directly related to the loan demand of 
commercial borrowers.  
Our paper is related to several literatures. First, the literature on how bank 
performance affects credit supply, including Kang and Stulz (2000), Ongena, Smith, and 
Michalsen (2003), Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini (2007), and Berger and 
Bouwman (2008, 2009), Schnabl (2009), Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2009). More 
broadly, the literature on how stock market returns affect real investment, including 
Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993), Baker, Stein, Wurgler (2003), Chen, Goldstein, 
and Jiang (2006). 
Second, the literature on why credit lines are not perfect substitutes for cash, 
including Sufi (2007). Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008), for example, find that many firms 
drew down their credit lines and kept the proceeds in low-yielding cash, leading to a 
“negative carry.”
1 The borrowers’ actions can be explained if they worry about their 
banks’ potential future distress, in light of our findings that credit lines from distressed 
banks are not as reliable a source of liquidity. Campello et al. (2009), using survey data, 
find that more credit-constrained firms are more likely to preemptively draw on their 
lines of credits. Their actions are again understandable because those types of borrowers 
are most likely to be rationed when their lenders are having their own problems.  
Finally, our results are important because research has shown that access to bank 
credit affects corporate financing and real investment policies (Roberts and Sufi, 2008a; 
                                                 
1 A typical explanation in a company’s 10-Q goes like this: “the Company had no immediate needs for 
additional liquidity; in light of the then current financial market conditions, the Company drew on the 
facility to provide it with greater financial flexibility.”   6
Lemmon and Roberts, 2007; Chava and Roberts, 2007; Chava and Purnanandam, 2008; 
Almeida, Campello, and Hackbarth, 2009; Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and 
Weisbenner, 2009; Gao and Yun, 2009).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we use the Survey of 
Terms of Business Lending to describe the commercial loan market in the US. In Section 
III, we present our main regression specifications and analyze takedown volumes of 
formal credit lines by borrower type and bank type. We also analyze loan pricing using 
individual loan-level data. In Section IV we conclude. 
 
II. Empirical Design 
A. Survey of Terms of Business Lending 
Our primary data source is the confidential Survey of Terms of Business Lending 
(STBL) conducted by the Federal Reserve. The micro-data have been used in many other 
papers, including Berger and Udell (1992, 2004), Lang and Nakamura (1995), Berger, 
Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998), Berlin and Mester (1999), Berger, Espinoza-Vega, 
Frame, and Miller (2005), Erel (2007) and Vickery (2008).  The Federal Reserve’s 
statistical release E.2., made public with a one-month lag, provides aggregate numbers 
from the STBL. The micro-data remain confidential information. 
The surveys take a snapshot of one week of new loan flows every 13 weeks. If the 
survey weeks are representative, our data should include about 7.7% of all new loan 
flows from a bank. The data cover all commercial and industrial (C&I) loans (new loans, 
takedowns under revolving credit agreements, and renewals) made by a surveyed bank to 
US addresses with a face value of at least $3,000, disbursed by surveyed banks during the 
first business week of every February, May, August, and November.  
These loans are arguably not directly affected by the problems in the subprime 
mortgage sector, because the surveys exclude construction and land development loans 
secured by real estate and loans to financial institutions. Existing loans on which the rates 
are repriced when no additional funds are disbursed are also excluded. The surveys cover 
both large syndicated loans studied extensively by many previous papers (typically based 
on the Dealscan database) and smaller and bilateral loans. The largest loan made during   7
our sample period was about $600 million and the largest commitment was about $60 
billion.
2  
One of the strengths of the data set is that it covers the new flow of loans. Publicly 
available data typically report end-of-period outstanding loan volumes and unused 
commitments. However, both an increase in takedowns and the termination of existing 
lines can reduce unused commitment numbers, and outstanding loan volume numbers can 
be affected by new loans, takedowns from existing revolvers, or retirement of existing 
loans. With end-of-period measures, it is impossible to pin down the timing and causes of 
the end-of-period changes. The STBL data also include rich information on loan 
characteristics such as a loan’s risk rating and commitment status (formal or informal). 
One of the weaknesses is that we do not know much about the borrowers, except 
some proxies for borrower size, risk, and bank-firm relationship length. Most important, 
although we know the amount of undrawn credits one month prior to the drawdown, we 
do not have information on individual credit lines that were not drawn upon during the 
survey weeks. In our econometric analyses, this shortcoming necessitates aggregating 
individual loan disbursements to the bank level and estimating models with bank fixed 
effects, assuming that the composition of existing credit lines does not change much 
within a short period of time for a bank.  
We focus on banks belonging to publicly traded bank holding companies, because 
their stock returns provide a real-time summary measure of individual bank performance, 
and such returns are more difficult to manipulate than accounting numbers. Since it is 
relatively easy to issue public equities in the US, only very small banks are excluded 
because of this restriction. The smallest publicly traded bank in our sample manages only 
about $120 million in total assets. 
In order to estimate a fixed-effect panel regression model, we require that banks 
in our sample must have participated in the STBL at least twice. The survey collects data 
from about 250 domestic commercial banks each time, and our final sample includes 
                                                 
2 For confidentiality reasons, the two numbers reported here are not exactly the same as the real amounts. 
Also note that the two numbers may reflect only one bank’s allocated portion if the facilities are 
syndicated. According to a special survey on 50 banks representative of US banking sector size 
distribution, syndicate loans account for less than 5% of C&I loans for one-fourth of the respondents, 
between 5% and 20% for one-half, and between 20% and 50% for one-fifth.   8
about 120 banks belonging to publicly traded bank holding companies.
3 Seven surveys 
were conducted during the sample period. About 73% of the observations in our panel 
data set were from banks that didn’t miss a single survey during the sample period, and 
90% of the observations were from banks that participated in at least four surveys. 
Therefore, our panel sample is relatively balanced. 
 
B. Overview of the commercial loan market in the US 
Table I (Panel A) presents some summary statistics of banks in our sample. A 
median bank in our sample has $556 million of commercial loans on its books and 
commits to another $435 million of undrawn commercial credits. The median bank 
originates about $7.8 million of new commercial loans every week. The sample includes 
the largest banks in the nation as well. The 95
th percentile bank in our sample has about 
$30 billion of commercial loans, another $54 billion in commitments, and disburses $1.8 
billion of new commercial loans every week.  
Table I (Panel B) describes the composition of new commercial loans. Consistent 
with previous studies (Shockley and Thakor 1997; Morgan 1998), in an average bank 
only 23% of new commercial loans are spot loans, i.e., term loans that are not associated 
with a credit line of some sort. In our sample 46% of banks make no spot loans at all. 
 In this study, we focus on formal credit lines that are committed at least one week 
before the takedown. A formal commitment is defined by the STBL as a commitment for 
which a bank has charged a fee or other consideration or otherwise has a legally binding 
commitment, which allows the borrower to take down funds at a certain spread over a 
base rate. Two other types of credit facilities are not the focus of this paper: 
(1)  Informal credit lines:  an informal arrangement under which the bank agrees 
to lend within a set credit limit and to quote a rate on demand for a takedown amount and 
maturity requested by the borrower. These arrangements are sometimes called 
“confirmed credit lines” and may not be legally binding. Lines backing up commercial 
paper issuances usually fall into this category (Calomiris, 1989). 
                                                 
3 The matching of banks with CRSP identifiers is based on the New York Fed’s list compiled by Adam 
Ashcraft, whose primary sources are SNL publications.  We double-checked and updated a number of 
matches, mainly caused by the changes in holding company structure since the construction of the New 
York Fed’s list, and several smaller publicly traded bank holding companies that might not be mentioned  
in SNL publications.    9
(2) New formal credit lines: formal credit lines that are initiated during the same 
or previous week of the loan takedown. These are effectively new loans with terms 
reflecting current updated bank conditions. 
Loans disbursed from the above two categories are not really precommitted. This 
paper instead focuses on precommitted, formal lines of credit, which, if they are really 
precommitted insurance, should not be affected by the financial conditions of the banks 
themselves.  
 
C. The subprime mortgage crisis 
The shock used in this study is the subprime mortgage crisis starting in the 
summer of 2007, the only one fully blown national banking crisis in decades, during 
which the viability of large and small banks nationwide was in doubt. In the LTCM 
crisis, in comparison, according to Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000) based on bank stock 
returns, only four banks were affected.  
Our data sample covers the period from May 2007 to November 2008.  The 
summer of 2007 is considered the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis. Ivashina 
and Scharfstein (2008) show that new lending to large corporate borrowers peaked in the 
period March-May 2007. The crisis was originated from the residential mortgage sector, 
and its impacts were isolated in the banking sector until the last quarter of 2008. Until 
then, in sharp contrast to the nosedive of financial stocks, the return on nonfinancial 
stocks had remained in the positive territory. Throughout the sample period, the share of 
commercial and industrial loans in nonperforming loan portfolios was never above 12%, 
and the share was actually declining over time as the problems in residential real estate 
loans deteriorated. 
  We end the sample period in November also because of the TARP Capital 
Purchase Program that started to inject equity directly into banks around that time. 
Nineteen of the top 20 banks in our sample received TARP money. By bank size, about 
80% of large banks and 50% of small banks in our sample eventually received TARP 
money. After TARP, it became difficult to evaluate banks’ own independent strength.  
Bank stock returns provide real-time summary indicators of short-term distress, 
more reliable than book equity valued or credit losses self-reported by banks. Table II   10
provides some statistics of bank stock returns during the crisis. Recent stock returns are 
measured at several alternative time horizons, namely, 1 week, 2 weeks, 4 weeks, and 13 
weeks (i.e., a quarter) prior to the weeks during which the STBL is conducted.  The 
correlation table in Panel A shows that stock returns measured at different time horizons 
are highly correlated with each other.  
Information in Panel B shows that average bank stock returns were particularly 
negative over the four-week periods leading up to the first business weeks of August 
2007, November 2007,  and November 2008, respectively, which were coincident with 
the two notable flare-ups  in financial market stress during the subprime mortgage crisis.  
Bank stock returns were more volatile during the banking crisis than in normal 
times and so were the differences across individual banks.  During the banking crisis, the 
differences between 1
st and 3
rd quartile banks in terms of stock return performance were 
on average 15 percentage points, while the difference was only five percentage points for 
the May 2007 survey, which immediately preceded the start of the banking crisis.  
The changing differences in financial distress across banks and over time 
presumably caused by banks’ exposure to the residential real estate sector provide us with 
useful variations to study how banks’ own financial conditions affect the supply of credit 
to commercial borrowers, in a sample period when the nonfinancial sector was not yet 
directly affected by the financial crisis. 
 
III. Empirical Analyses 
A. Regression model specification 
The panel regression model with both bank and time fixed effects is specified as 
follows. The models are estimated on a panel of 120 banks and 7 time periods. Residuals 
are allowed to cluster by bank.  
constant Effect   Fixed   Time Effect   Fixed Bank  Controls Bank 
) 1 Undrawn ( * Return Stock  ) 1 Takedown (
,
, 3 , 2 , 1 ,
     
      
t i t i
t i t i t i t i Ln NPL Ln   
 
“Takedown” is the total weekly dollar volume of loan disbursements under 
precommitted lines of credit from bank i at time t. The volume is aggregated from 
individual loan level data. In some large banks that submit less than five days of data 
during the survey week, the loan volumes are “blown up” to five days proportionately.    11
By taking the log of the dependent variable, the coefficients can be conveniently 
interpreted as the percentage decline of takedown volume for every percentage point 
decline in stock prices or every 0.01 increase in the nonperforming loan ratio (NPL).  
We model the level instead of the change rate of the takedown volume. The 
takedown volume is a flow variable in itself, and a panel model with bank fixed effects 
effectively analyzes the flow’s first-order difference. Taking further difference of it 
would measure instead the third-order change rate of credit supply. In some regression 
specifications, we also aggregate takedown volumes by several loan categories of interest 
(e.g., large facilities, relationship borrowers, risky borrowers) to tap into loan-level 
information available to us. 
We use banks stocks returns and the nonperforming loan ratio to measure banks’ 
financial health. The bank stock return is a summary indicator of short-term distress.
4 
Since banks do not depend much on frequent equity issuance for funding, lower stock 
returns do not necessarily reflect financial constraints as a result of lower valuation 
(Baker, Stein, Wurgler, 2003), but the market’s aggregated information about the banks’ 
conditions (Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers, 1993; Chen, Goldstein, Jiang, 2006; Hertzel 
et al., 2008).  Stock returns are measured as the log return of bank stock price (adjusting 
for splits and dividends) relative to four weeks ago.
 We also use 1 week, 2 weeks, and 13 
weeks (i.e., a quarter) as alternative horizons.  
A second measure of bank financial distress is the ratio of nonperforming loans to 
total loans, which reflects bank asset quality and is more difficult to manipulate than 
other accounting indicators because of its objective definition (e.g., loans overdue for 
more than 90 days are considered nonperforming). The data are obtained from regulatory 
reports filed based on financial information at the end of every March, June, September, 
and December, about one month prior to the STBL, which takes place in the first week of 
February, May, August, and November. Throughout the sample period, the share of 
commercial and industrial loans in nonperforming loan portfolios was never above 12%, 
and was actually declining over time as the problems in residential real estate loans 
                                                 
4 The Interagency Guidance on Funding and Liquidity Risk Management, issued jointly by five U.S. bank 
regulators, defines stress events as “deterioration in asset quality, changes in agency credit ratings, Prompt 
Corrective Action (PCA) and CAMELS ratings downgrades, widening of credit default spreads, operating 
losses, declining financial institution equity prices, negative press coverage, or other events that may call 
into question an institution’s ability to meet its obligations.”   12
deteriorated. This mitigates the endogeneity concern that the nonperforming loan ratio 
may reflect the deterioration of borrowers’ conditions. 
Unfortunately, credit default swap (CDS) prices cannot be used as an alternative 
measure because they are available for very few US commercial banks. Unlike the active 
CDS markets for European banks, market quotes are currently available for only four US 
commercial banks, two investment banks, and two credit card banks in the US.
5  For the 
four commercial banks, CDS returns are negatively correlated with equity returns, both 
across banks and over time. Even during the abnormal period of October 2008 when CDS 
prices and bank stock prices moved unusually in the same direction (i.e., down), the two 
variables were negatively correlated across banks. 
The limitation of our data set is that we do not have information on credit lines 
that are not drawn upon. In addition to aggregating loan volume to the bank level, we 
take two steps to address the heterogeneity of takedown volume across banks.  
First, as banks enter the survey multiple times, we are able to estimate a bank 
fixed-effect panel regression model. Data limitations prevent us from directly observing 
the takedown habit and patterns of credit line customers unless they draw on the credit 
lines. For example, if a bank’s customers use the lines mostly for short-term working 
capital management and repay loans frequently, then the bank’s gross loan flow will 
inevitably be higher than in other banks with similar amounts of undrawn credit 
available. Bank fixed effects address this problem if we can assume that a bank’s credit 
line customer composition does not change rapidly within a short period of time, and 
therefore its aggregate takedown volume should have a strong bank-specific component. 
Second, we control for “Undrawn,” the bank’s undrawn portions of legally 
binding loan commitments, because obviously takedown volume is affected by the 
amount of commitments available. Specifically, following Kashyap, Rajan and Stein 
(2002) we use data item RCFD3818 from the regulatory Call Report of Income and 
Condition. The data reflect information about one month prior to the survey week. The 
variable is included on the right-hand side of the equation for two reasons. First, it is a 
noisy variable, although it is the best available. The variable includes mostly commercial 
and industrial loan commitments, but it also includes small amounts of commitments to 
                                                 
5 Based on information from the Bloomberg terminal as of June 2009. Datastream has similar coverage.   13
purchase securities or other assets. Not all takedowns from those facilities are covered by 
the STBL. For example, loans to financial institutions are not covered by the STBL. 
Second, reported one month ago, it is a noisy measure of undrawn credit immediately 
prior to the survey week. Finally, the variable also doubles as a control for bank size, 
since the two are highly correlated. 
Finally, we also control for some bank financial characteristics. In a panel 
regression model with bank fixed effects, the coefficients on them will capture the effects 
of time series fluctuations in these bank characteristics. The control variables include 
equity to asset ratio, core deposit ratio, liquid asset ratio, and return on assets.  
These financial ratios are based on information from consolidated financial 
reports (Y-9C) filed by the bank holding companies.
6 We believe that it is the 
consolidated bank holding company’s financial health that matters the most. As in the 
Call Report, the information from the Y-9C is about 1 month old by time the lending 
decisions are made. 
 
B. Regression estimation results 
B.1. Credit line takedowns are sensitive to bank distress 
In Table III, we estimate our main regression specification with four alternative 
measures of stock returns, i.e., stock returns relative to four weeks, one week, two weeks, 
and one quarter (13 weeks) ago. The regressions include time fixed-effects dummy 




                                                 
6 The formula for the financial ratios are as follows:  
Equity to Total Asset Ratio = bhck3210/bhck2170 
Core Deposit to Total Asset Ratio = 
(bhcb2210+bhcb3187+bhcb2389+bhcb6648+bhod3189+bhod3187+bhod2389+bhod6648+bhfn6636)/bhck
2170 
Nonperforming Loan to Total Loan Ratio = 
(bhck5526-bhck3507+bhck1616+bhck5525-bhck3506)/bhck2122 
Liquid Asset to Total Asset Ratio = (bhck0010+bhdmb987+bhckb989+bhck1754+bhck1773)/bhck2170 
Return on Asset Ratio = bhck4340/bhck3368   14
The results in Column (1) suggest that a 1% decline in stock price in the past four 
weeks is related to a 2.68% lower takedown volume in credit lines. A 0.01 increase in the 
nonperforming loan ratio is related to a 45% lower takedown volume.  
The results suggest that a bank’s credit line takedown volume is 15×2.67= 40% 
lower when its stock return in the past four weeks is 15% lower (which is the 1
st to 3
rd 
quartile difference in bank stock returns). Similarly, the takedown volume is 0.012 
×45.48= 63.7% lower when its nonperforming loan ratio increases by 0.012 (which is the 
1
st to 3
rd quartile difference in the nonperforming loan ratio). 
In Column (2), we also control for stock returns over the four-week period after 
the survey week, to address the possibility that banks may have private information that 
the stock market learns only later. We find that the takedown volume is 1.1% lower for 
every 1% drop in stock return over the next four weeks. However, the influence of future 
returns is not statistical significant. After controlling for future stock returns, every 1% 
lower stock return in the past four weeks still leads to 2.18% lower takedown volumes.  
In Columns (3), (4), and (5), stock returns are measured relative to one week, two 
weeks, and thirteen weeks (one quarter) prior to the loan takedowns. The effects of bank 
stock returns on takedown volumes seem to be stronger for more recent returns. For 
every 1% decline in stock price, the impact on loan volume is 3.5% after one week, 2% 
after two weeks, 2.7% after four weeks, and 0.9% (and not statistically significant) after 
thirteen weeks. The results suggest that bank stock returns have a short-term impact on 
loan volumes, and the impact diminishes to zero within a quarter. Therefore, our flow 
data on new loans have a unique advantage over typical quarterly end-of-period stock 
measures of loans outstanding used in other studies, because with the latter measure it is 
not possible to pin down the timing and the causes of the change in the numbers for end-
of-quarter loans outstanding.   
Finally, the coefficient on the variable for undrawn loan commitments one month 
ago is close to 0.9, suggesting that a 1% decline in undrawn commitments translates into 
almost a 0.9% decline in takedown volume one month after.  
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B.2. Takedowns by risky, nonrelationship, and smaller borrowers 
So far we have treated takedowns by all borrowers equally. In the next step, we 
distinguish takedowns by borrowers of different characteristics. The results are reported 
in Table IV. 
First, we distinguish between high-risk and low-risk borrowers. The data set 
contains loan risk ratings provided by the banks. We define high-risk loans as those 
internally rated as four or five (in a 1-5 scale), or nonrated (in banks that do have a rating 
system), at the time of loan disbursement.  
A rating of four is defined as “acceptable risk.” Loans in this category have a 
limited chance of resulting in a loss. A rating of five is defined as “special mention or 
classified asset” – loans in this category would generally fall into the examination 
categories: “special mention,” “substandard,” “doubtful,” or “loss.” They would 
primarily be workout loans. Nonrated loans are typically smaller, more risky loans and 
carry an average interest rate just below those loans rated four. We exclude a small 
number of banks that do not have a risk-rating system at all. A caveat is that as ratings are 
inevitably subjective (English and Nelson, 1998), they may be more informative in 
comparing borrowers within the same bank.  
In Column (1), the dependent variable is the total volume of takedowns by lower 
risk borrowers, while in Column (2) it’s the total volume of takedowns by higher risk 
borrowers. We find that it is mostly high-risk borrowers that are affected by their banks’ 
financial conditions. We find that in response to a 1% lower bank stock return, the loan 
volume for higher risk borrowers is 2.3% lower, whereas that for lower risk borrowers is 
only 0.9% lower (and not statistically significant). This is consistent with Ivashina and 
Scharfstein’s (2008) findings that non-investment-grade loans fell more than investment 
grade loans during the subprime mortgage crisis and with Lang and Nakamura’s (1995) 
findings that banks lend more to less risky borrowers during economic downturns. 
Second, we distinguish between borrowers of longer and shorter relationship with 
the bank. We define relationship borrowers as those who draw down on lines committed 
more than 365 days ago. The measure is imperfect because some borrowers may have 
multiple facilities with the banks and we do not observe those that are not drawn upon 
during the survey weeks. However, we are sure that borrowers classified by us as   16
relationship borrowers clearly have relationships of more than one year with their banks. 
Berger and Udell (1995) consider a formal line of credit as a formalization of bank-
borrower relationships and find that borrowers with longer banking relationships enjoy 
better terms in their lines of credit. 
In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the total volume of takedowns 
by relationship and nonrelationship borrowers, respectively. We find that in response to a 
1% lower bank stock return, the loan volume for borrowers with shorter relationships is 
2.3% lower, whereas that for borrowers with relationships of more than one year  is 0.2% 
higher (not statistically significant).  
Third, we distinguish between large and small borrowers. We do not have a direct 
measure of borrower size. Following the previous literature (Erel 2007; Vickery 2008) 
that uses the same data, we use the commitment size of the credit lines as proxies for 
borrower size.  Both Melnik and Plaut (1986) and Ham and Melnik (1987) find that the 
size of the credit line commitment is positively related to firm size. In Column (5), the 
dependent variable is the total loan takedown volume by borrowers with a credit line of at 
least $10 million with the bank, while Column (6) is for borrowers with a smaller line.  
In Columns (7) and (8), we use an alternative measure of borrower size based on 
loan size. The dependent variable in Column (7) is the total volume of loan takedowns of 
at least $0.5 million, while Column (8) is for smaller loan takedowns. Note that the small 
borrowers in our sample, based on either definition, are unlikely to be present in Ivashina 
and Scharfstein’s (2008) sample of large syndicated borrowers from the LPC Dealscan 
database. 
Results in Columns (5)–(8) show that smaller borrowers are significantly affected 
by their banks’ financial conditions, whereas the amount of funds disbursed from large 
credit line facilities actually increases slightly in response to heightened bank distress, 
that is, a 0.6% increase (but not statistically significant) for large facilities vs. a 2.2% 
decrease for small facilities in response to a 1% lower stock return.  The results are 
consistent with those of Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008), who find that borrowers 
(typically very large ones) in their sample were able to draw on credit lines at the height 
of the financial turmoil.   17
There are two possible explanations for this discrimination. First, large borrowers 
are considered more important customers for the banks because they have more outside 
options and thus better bargaining positions. Second, larger credit lines are more likely to 
be part of a syndicated deal, and therefore, individual banks may not have strong control 
over the borrower’s takedown decisions. 
The results also shed some light on the reverse causality concern. Dahiya, 
Saunders, and Srinivasan (2003) find that there is a significant wealth effect for the 
shareholders of the lead bank when an isolated large borrower of the bank experiences 
distress. However, it is less likely that the financial distress of some small borrowers may 
drive the bank’s stock market performance. 
To sum up, in this section we find that the results previously documented in 
Section B.1 are stronger for credit lines to risky borrowers, nonrelationship borrowers, 
and smaller borrowers. In all regressions, the sensitivity of takedown volume to 
nonperforming loan ratio (an alternative measure of bank performance) is also stronger 
for these borrower categories. 
 
B.3. How may banks influence takedown volumes of precommitted lines of credit? 
At first sight, precommitted credit lines should provide insurance for borrowers 
because both credit limits and terms are set ex-ante. Takedown volumes under 
precommitted credit lines are supposed to be determined purely by the demand from 
borrowers. Why do we find that they are also affected by the banks’ own financial 
conditions? A very intuitive answer, along the lines of Sufi (2007), is that these credit 
lines may not be as “committed” as on paper. Banks may retain some implicit influence 
over borrowers’ takedown decisions, and the influence may come from some important 
discretion enjoyed by the banks. 
First, banks have discretion over whether to waive the borrower’s current or 
future compliance with covenants, as well as the renewal of credit facilities. 
Credit lines typically come with financial covenants (Bradley and Roberts, 2003; 
Chava and Roberts 2007). However, when a firm breaches a financial covenant that leads   18
to a “technical default,” the creditor typically renegotiates the contract and it rarely leads 
to default or acceleration of the loan (Gopalakrishnan and Parkash, 1995).
7 
Such technical defaults are very frequent even during normal times and outside of 
financial distress (Gopalakrishnan and Parkash, 1995; Dichev and Skinner, 2002), 
because covenants are intentionally set very tight; i.e., the distance between the 
covenants’ threshold and the actual accounting measure is very small (Kahan and 
Tuckman, 1995; Garleanu and Zwiebel, 2009). Chava and Roberts (2007), for example, 
show that about 15% of borrowers are in violation at any point in time, and more than a 
third of borrowers are in violation at some point during their ten-year sample period. 
 Arguably, such violations are expected to be more likely during an economic 
downturn when many borrowers’ cash flows are negatively affected by the economy. 
Therefore, banks were in a much stronger bargaining position during the crisis and could 
pressure borrowers who may worry about future unfavorable treatment even when they 
are currently in full compliance with all covenants. 
Second, banks also have discretion over the intensity of collateral auditing. In 
addition to a maximum credit limit, many credit lines also specify a “borrowing base,” 
which is a lending formula that limits borrowings to a certain percentage of collateral, the 
most common being receivables and inventory. Firms are not allowed to borrow more 
than their “borrowing base.” Banks reserve the right to regularly check the collateral, but 
they also have discretion over the frequency and rigor of auditing. More than 80% of 
precommitted credit lines in our sample are secured, but not by real estate collateral. 
They are most likely credit facilities with “borrowing base” restrictions.  
Anecdotal evidence (CFO Magazine, May 19, 2009) suggests that during the 
good times, banks may not regularly conduct the audits of inventories or accounts 
receivable and simply trust that what borrowers claim in their weekly or monthly updates 
is accurate. They are more likely to waive the right of inspection to win over a borrower. 
In contrast, during the crisis, in particular when they experienced their own capital and 
liquidity problems and were pressured by bank examiners from regulatory agencies, 
                                                 
7 Roberts and Sufi (2008b) show that renegotiations of loan facility terms occur in 90% of firms over the 
life of the facilities. They argue that covenants are included not to avoid renegotiations but to shape ex-post 
bargaining power during negotiations. The banks may waive the borrower’s noncompliance with covenants 
if the borrowers reduce capital expenditures (Chava and Roberts, 2007). Banks may also alter the terms and 
reduce allowable borrowings (Beneish and Press, 1993; Chen and Wei, 1993) after technical violations.   19
banks stepped up their auditing intensity significantly and started to exclude from eligible 
collateral “unsellable T-shirts for 7-foot-tall women.” The audits very often led to a 
reduction of the borrowing base, because many firms were sitting on products that they 
had overpaid for before the crisis and receivables from troubled clients such as the big 
three automakers. 
After the audits, a bank may immediately require the borrower to post more 
collateral or lower the loan balance to the new borrowing base.  Therefore, collateral 
audits provide another tool for the banks to control takedown volumes when they want to. 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that during the crisis, many collateral auditors were 
asked by banks to look at companies that previously weren’t inspected, and audits 
became much more frequent (sometimes semi-quarterly) when a borrower was on the 
brink of breaking loan covenants or when a credit line was up for renewal.  
To sum up, although both credit limits and terms are set ex-ante, banks retain 
significant influence over borrowers’ takedown decisions because banks have discretion 
over whether to waive the borrower’s future covenant violations, to renew contracts, and 
to audit collaterals.  Borrowers choose to cooperate if they value future relations with the 
banks. Roberts and Sufi (2008a) find that borrowers rarely switch lenders even after 
banks have imposed unfavorable terms after covenant violations. 
 
B.4. Takedown volumes in different types of banks 
Gatev and Strahan (2006) find that banks with a strong core deposit base are in a 
stronger position to provide liquidity during financial market turmoil. Gatev and Strahan 
(2008) in particular show that in loan syndications, banks (vs. nonbank investors) are 
more likely to participate in loan deals that involve a credit line and thus contingent 
liquidity needs. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) find that banks with better access to 
deposit funding were less likely to curtail lending during the subprime mortgage crisis.  
Further, Berger and Bouwman (2008, 2009) document that better capitalized banks create 
more liquidity during banking crises than poorly capitalized banks.  
In Table V, we estimate the same regressions for different types of banks. We sort 
the banks into many half groups based on measures of various bank characteristics. 
Banks are divided into two groups based on the ratio of core deposits to total assets   20
(median=0.5892), the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (median=0.1922), the ratio of 
equity to total assets (median=0.0948), or total assets (median= $7.128 billion). A bank’s 
type is decided by its average financial ratios or size over the whole sample period.  
We choose to estimate the regression models separately for a subgroup of banks, 
because the alternative methods, interaction terms, create severe multicollinearity 
problems for us. For example, the correlation is as high as 0.687 between the 4-week 
stock return and the interaction term: (4-week stock return)* (high liquidity ratio 
dummy). Our approach sacrifices some estimation power. When drawing conclusions 
from the results below, we focus more on the economic significance of the differences, 
which help us make statements on the distributional effects (e.g., in which types of banks 
are the effects concentrated?). However, we cannot say much about the statistical 
significance of the differences across two types of banks. 
Results in Columns (1) and (2) show that among banks funded less by core retail 
deposits, takedown volumes are 3.2% lower in response to a 1% stock price decline. By 
contrast, the drop in volume is only 1.6% among banks funded more by core retail 
deposits.
8  
For a 1% drop in bank stock price, the takedown volume is 3.3% lower among 
low-liquidity banks, vs. 1.9% lower among high-liquidity banks (Columns 3 and 4). The 
volume is 3.8% lower among low capital banks, vs. 0.8% among high capital banks 
(Columns 5 and 6). The volume is 4.5% lower among small banks, vs. 0.4% lower among 
large banks (Columns 7 and 8).  
The results provide suggestive evidence that banks hold liquid assets to address 
liquidity needs arising from loan demand (Kashyap et al. 2002). The results are consistent 
with Kashyap and Stein’s (2000) results that small and illiquid banks adjust their loan 
supply more actively in response to adverse conditions (in their case policy-induced 
monetary policy tightening). 
                                                 
8 We likely underestimate the importance of core retail deposits. First, unlike in Gatev and Strahan (2006) 
and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008), we do not have investment banks (such as Goldman Sachs, Lehman 
Brothers, Merrill Lynch) or finance companies (CIT group and GE Capital) in our sample. In Ivashina and 
Scharfstein’s (2008) sample, the 25th percentile bank has no deposits at all. By contrast, in our commercial 
bank sample the difference in core deposit ratio between 25th and 75th percentile banks is just above 10%. 
Second, the FDIC’s decision to raise guarantee limits for deposits probably reduced the disadvantage of 
those banks with lower core deposits.   21
It is interesting to note that takedown volume is more sensitive to the 
nonperforming loan ratio among more highly capitalized banks (Columns 5 and 6) and 
more deposit-funded banks (Columns 1 and 2). It is possible that when a bank is highly 
capitalized with equities or when a bank is funded by relatively stable deposits, it is more 
concerned with rising credit problems on its loan books (as measured by the 
nonperforming loan ratio) because the bank’s high franchise value may discourage risk-
taking. 
To sum up, the subprime mortgage crisis has distributional effects on lenders and 
borrowers. The heterogeneity of credit supply across banks during the crisis resulted not 
only from differences in bank distress but also from the interaction of bank distress with 
bank balance-sheet structures (e.g., funding structures, liquidity conditions, size). The 
aggregate loan volumes in the banking sector may still go up, but they will mostly come 
from large and more liquid banks with fewer exposures and fewer losses from the real 
estate sector. Small and risky borrowers that are served by small and illiquid banks with 
few retail deposits will likely be disproportionately affected.  
 
B.5. Loans without prior commitments 
This study focuses on formal credit lines that are committed at least one week 
before the takedowns. Three other loan categories are not the focus of this paper because 
their credit terms can be adjusted in response to recent changes in bank financial 
conditions: (1) Spot loans: term loans not made under any credit line facilities; (2) 
Informal credit lines:  the terms of which are determined at the time of loan 
disbursement; (3) New formal credit lines: loans disbursed from formal credit lines that 
are initiated during the same or previous week.
9  
How do banks adjust loan quantity and prices in these categories? To help 
understand why banks ration credit in formal credit lines, in this section we study the 
                                                 
9 Note that the takedown volume under newly initiated credit lines may not be a good proxy for the 
origination volume of new formal credit lines, because the data allow us to observe only those lines that are 
drawn upon during the survey weeks. The variable is more a measure of the origination volume of formal 
credit lines that tend to be tapped into almost immediately after initiations, which can be very different 
from other credit lines. For example, we notice that the commitment sizes tend to be smaller but the loan 
takedowns tend to be larger. These loans are more likely to charge fixed interest rates.   22
changes in quantities, and in the next section, the changes in pricing terms of newly 
negotiated commercial loans, in response to changes in banks’ own financial conditions. 
In Columns (1) – (3) of Table VI, the dependent variables are, respectively, the 
total volume of new spot loans, takedowns under informal credit lines, and takedowns 
under new formal credit lines. What these three loan categories share in common is that 
they are not bounded by terms set in the past before the changes in bank conditions. For 
spot loans, we control for the amount of C&I loans outstanding one month before. For the 
latter two categories, we control for the amount of undrawn credits.  
We find that loan volume in none of the three categories responds significantly to 
the banks’ own financial conditions, measured by banks’ stock returns or nonperforming 
loan ratios. In other words, more distressed banks do not reduce loan volume in these 
categories more than less distressed banks. However, in the next sub-section, we will 
show that distressed banks raise interest rates instead, in these loan categories. 
In Column (4) we use the total volume of all new commercial loans as the 
dependent variable, which include all categories, both spot loans and credit line 
takedowns, formal and informal credit lines, old and new credit lines. We find that the 
total volume of new commercial loans is not sensitive to the banks’ own financial 
conditions. To sum up, the evidence above suggests that banks respond to deterioration in 
their own financial conditions mainly by rationing precommitted, formal credit lines. 
Research based on publicly available data that do not observe loan flows and do not 
distinguish between term loans and takedowns from credit lines would most likely not be 
able to uncover what we find in this paper. 
 
B.6. Distressed banks raise credit spreads on new loans but not in precommitted 
formal credit lines 
Since we also have access to loan-level data, in this section we analyze credit 
spreads of new loans. In response to changes in their own financial conditions, banks can 
adjust the credit terms of new loans, including new spot loans, informal credit lines 
(because their terms are negotiated at the time of loan disbursement), and newly 
negotiated formal credit lines. However, they cannot do much about the interest rates on 
precommitted revolving credit facilities.   23
Credit spreads on individual loans are described by the following empirical 
model: 
constant Effect   Fixed   Time Controls Bank 
Controls Loan  * * Return Stock 
,
, 2 , 1
    
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i t i
t i t i NPL Spread  
 
  Following Erel (2007), who uses the same data set, credit spreads (in %) are 
measured as effective (compounded) annual nominal interest rates over yields on 
Treasury securities of similar repricing intervals.  The spreads do not include fees, which 
may differ across large and small facilities. But we will control for loan and facility size. 
Loan controls include the log of loan size, log of loan commitment size, dummy 
variables for secured (collateralized) loans, for loans with maturity greater than one year 
(including loans without a stated maturity), for loans without a stated maturity, and for 
fixed-rate loans. Loan risks are controlled for with dummy variables for nonrated loans 
(in banks that do rate loans),  dummy variables for loans with an internal risk rating of 2 
through 5, respectively, and a dummy variable for loans that are not rated because the 
banks do not rate loans. Loans with a risk rating of 1 are used as the benchmark and a 
dummy variable for them is not included in the regressions. Table VII summarizes the 
characteristics of individual loans in our sample. Relative to credit facilities in the 
Dealscan database, facilities in our sample are smaller and are much more likely to be 
secured (collateralized) partly because typically only very large and creditworthy 
borrowers can obtain credit without collateral.  
Bank performance is measured using bank stock returns relative to one month ago 
and the nonperforming loan ratio one month ago. We further control for bank 
characteristics using financial ratios such as the equity ratio, core deposit ratio, liquidity 
ratio, and return on assets. We also control for bank size using the log of total commercial 
loans outstanding. Time fixed effects are included, and all standard errors are adjusted for 
the clustering of residual by banks.  
In Table VII, we estimate the credit spread model separately for four different 
types of loans. Specifically, Column (1) is for loans disbursed from precommitted formal 
credit lines, Column (2) is for loans disbursed from credit lines initiated in the same or 
previous week, Column (3) is for loans disbursed from informal credit lines, and Column 
(4) is for new term loans not affiliated with any credit lines. Arguably, banks can directly   24
adjust loan terms in the latter three categories, in response to recent changes in their own 
financial conditions. 
As expected, we find that the credit spreads increase about 17 bps on loans 
disbursed from informal credit lines or recently negotiated formal credit lines, for every 
0.01 increase in a bank’s nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio one month ago. Credit spreads 
increase about 14 bps for new term loans, for every 0.01 increase in NPL ratio.
10 We do 
not find past stock returns to have significantly affected credit spreads.  
By contrast, credit spreads on loans disbursed from precommitted formal credit 
lines do not respond significantly either to poor stock price performance or to 
deteriorations in NPL ratios. This is expected because credit spread in a loan commitment 
is set ex-ante. Even if we allow the commitment contract to be renegotiated, we can think 
of two possibilities that explain the results. First, instead of raising credit spreads by 17 
bps on loans disbursed from precommitted formal credit lines as they would have done in 
informal credit lines (as shown above), the banks somehow exert influence on borrowers 
to reduce takedown volume by 45% (as shown in Section B.1), leading to lower loan 
quantity. Second, the banks may have renegotiated many existing contracts to raise 
interest rates significantly, but as a result, those borrowers were less likely to take out 
funds and therefore did not enter the STBL sample. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Using the subprime mortgage crisis as a shock, this paper shows that more 
distressed banks (as measured by recent stock returns or the nonperforming loan ratio) 
disbursed fewer funds to commercial and industrial borrowers under precommitted credit 
lines. Risky borrowers (by internal loan ratings), smaller borrowers, and borrowers with 
shorter relationships were more affected. The evidence suggests that credit lines provide 
contingent, partial, instead of committed insurance for borrowers and provides a new 
explanation why credit lines are not perfect substitutes for corporate cash holdings, at 
least not for smaller, riskier firms with relatively short relationships with their lenders. 
Our explanation for the sensitivity of credit line utilizations to banks’ own financial 
                                                 
10 Note that our data allow the analyses of interest rates only, while Campello et al. (2009) also document  
the increase in commitment fees for newly negotiated lines.   25
conditions is that banks may have significant influence on borrowers’ takedown 
decisions, resulting from their discretion over the borrowers’ compliance with financial 
covenants. 
One of our data’s main weaknesses is that we do not have information on credit 
facilities that were not drawn upon during the survey weeks. By contrast, databases such 
as Dealscan observe facilities’ initiations but not future takedowns. Future research that 
tracks takedown volumes over time by hand-collected information from borrowers’ SEC 
regulatory filings may be able to shed more light on the detailed mechanism through 
which banks influence borrowers’ takedown decisions in precommitted credit lines, in 
particular, with information on the borrowers’ financial conditions (e.g., distance to 
covenant violations) during the lenders distressed periods, and the borrowers’ future 
access to credit and renegotiation outcomes with the same lenders.   26
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Table I (Panel A): Summary of bank characteristics 
 
This table describes banks in our sample. The summary statistics are based on a panel of 120 banks and 682 
observations. C&I loans are commercial and industrial loans outstanding on a bank’s book. C&I 
commitments are undrawn portions of formal commitments to make C&I loans. Weekly C&I loans are the 
weekly volume of new C&I loan flow during a survey week. Commitment to total exposures ratio is 
calculated as C&I commitment / (C&I commitment + C&I loan) 
 
 Mean  S.  Dev.  25th  Median  75th  95th 
C&I loan ($000)  5,380,946  14,400,000  172,473  556,495  1,677,809  30,100,000 
C&I commitment ($000)  13,500,000  53,600,000  120,633  434,598  1,600,456  54,400,000 
Weekly C&I loan  ($000)  237,620  699,926  2,079  7,796  48,350  1,829,082 
Commitment/ Exposures  0.478  0.143  0.402  0.465  0.540  0.745 
Deposit ratio  0.705  0.086  0.654  0.717  0.764  0.819 
Core deposit ratio  0.583  0.090  0.536  0.590  0.643  0.712 
Equity ratio  0.094  0.019  0.082  0.095  0.106  0.127 
Liquidity ratio  0.223  0.103  0.154  0.195  0.263  0.477 
NPL ratio  0.013  0.013  0.006  0.009  0.015  0.036 
quarterly ROA  0.005  0.006  0.003  0.005  0.007  0.013 
quarterly ROE  0.048  0.069  0.028  0.048  0.079  0.129 
 
Table I (Panel B): Composition of new commercial loans 
 
This table describes the composition of new commercial loans in STBL data. The ratios are the shares of a 
certain type of loans in a bank’s new commercial loan flow. The summary statistics are based on a panel of 
120 banks and 682 observations. Risky loans are loans with an internal risk rating of 4 or 5, or non-rated. 
Formal credit lines are loans disbursed from legally-binding commitments. Relationship loans are loans 
disbursed from formal credit lines initiated or renewed more than one year ago.  Large facility loans are 
loans from formal credit lines with commitment size of greater than $10 million. Spot loans are term loans 
not associated with a credit line facility. Informal credit lines are lines of credit that are not legally binding, 
and the terms of which are negotiated at the time of disbursement.  
 
% Mean  S.Dev. 
Non-Zero 
observations 
(%) 25th Median  75th 
Risky loan  38.5  35.9  83.4  2.6  30.3  73.7 
Formal credit lines  42.2  40.5  60.7  0.0  39.3  83.3 
-  risky  15.2  23.8  50.9  0.0  0.1  24.9 
-  relationship  15.0  21.5  50.4  0.0  0.2  26.5 
-  large facility  16.6  26.2  41.1  0.0  0.0  26.8 
-  large loan  20.1  28.5  42.1  0.0  0.0  37.8 
Spot loans  22.7  35.2  53.8  0.0  1.1  33.7 
Informal credit lines  14.5  32.9  26.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
New credit lines  20.5  30.5  70.8  0.0  6.5  25.4 
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Table II: Bank stock performance during the subprime mortgage crisis 
 
Panel A:  Correlation between past stock returns at different time interval 
 
This table describes the piecewise correlation between stock returns measured at different time intervals.  
 








4 weeks return  1       
1 weeks return  0.4058  1     
2 weeks return  0.7536  0.5372  1   
13 weeks return  0.3430  0.1854  0.2526  1 
 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics of bank stock returns 
 
This table provides summary statistics of bank stock returns. Stock returns are log change in stock prices 
relative to one week, two weeks, four weeks, and 13 weeks ago. For stock return relative to four weeks ago, 
summary statistics are presented also by different time periods. 
 
Log stock return (%) 
 relative to  Mean  S.Dev.   25th  Median  75th 
1 week ago  2.56  8.22  -2.41  1.20  7.42 
2 weeks ago  1.48  11.04  -5.04  0.02  7.68 
4 weeks ago  -1.83  14.82  -11.86  -1.29  6.71 
  - May 2007  0.14  4.61  -2.82  0.22  3.27 
  - Aug 2007  -12.65  10.03  -18.03  -13.00  -8.31 
  - Nov 2007  -12.08  10.14  -18.76  -14.11  -5.57 
  - Feb 2008  9.80  8.75  2.96  10.83  16.54 
  - May 2008  -0.40  10.84  -3.73  0.89  6.37 
  - Aug 2008  12.74  14.39  5.19  13.82  23.52 
  - Nov 2008  -9.94  16.69  -16.19  -9.31  0.74 
13 weeks ago  -7.86  17.63  -15.43  -5.58  1.99 
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Table III:  More distressed banks experience lower takedown volumes in their pre-
committed credit lines 
The panel regression model with bank fixed-effect  is specified as follows: 
constant Effect   Fixed   Time Effect   Fixed Bank  Controls Bank 
) 1 Undrawn ( * Return Stock  ) 1 Takedown (
,
, 3 , 2 , 1 ,
     
      
t i t i
t i t i t i t i Ln NPL Ln   
 
The dependent variable is the log of weekly takedown volume under precommitted formal credit lines. 
Bank stock returns are measured relative to one week, two weeks, four weeks, and thirteen weeks ago. A 
second measure of bank distress is the bank’s nonperforming loan ratio. Also controlled for are, unused 
portion of loan commitments, equity ratio, core deposit ratio, liquid asset ratio, and return on asset, all 
measured at about one month prior to the loan disbursement.  The model is estimated with bank fixed 
effects and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering of residuals by banks are in 
parentheses, and ***, **, * indicates statistical significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  4-week return  4-week return  1-week return  2-week return  13-week return 
       
Stock Return (4 weeks)  0.0267*** 0.0218**     
  (0.00887) (0.00834)    
Stock Return (1 week)      0.0349**    
     (0.0143)    
Stock Return (2 weeks)        0.0199**   
       (0.00997)   
Stock  Return  (13  weeks)      0.00886 
      (0.00938) 
Stock  Return  (4  weeks  ahead)   0.0108     
   (0.00825)     
NPL Ratio  -45.48* -46.46* -54.60**  -50.99* -50.16* 
  (24.10) (23.83) (27.55) (26.61) (27.38) 
Ln  (undrawn)  0.893 0.872 0.889 0.880 0.864 
  (0.612) (0.613) (0.630) (0.613) (0.601) 
Equity  Ratio  1.742 0.850 -1.666  3.815 0.133 
  (9.218) (9.159) (9.910) (9.173) (9.379) 
Core  Deposit  Ratio  7.867 7.684 7.846 7.774 7.094 
  (5.784) (5.862) (5.824) (5.742) (5.799) 
Liquid  Asset  Ratio  7.386 3.850 6.549 7.110 6.673 
  (5.778) (4.857) (5.728) (5.729) (5.710) 
Return  on  Asset  -42.04 -47.30 -39.29 -42.08 -44.16 
  (33.46) (33.67) (33.59) (33.54) (31.28) 
Aug  2007  0.763**  0.685* 0.544* 0.577* 0.510 
  (0.362) (0.359) (0.324) (0.345) (0.349) 
Nov  2007  0.866**  0.745* 0.779* 0.600  0.559 
  (0.422) (0.432) (0.416) (0.395) (0.380) 
Feb  2008  0.434 0.737*  0.434 0.409 0.732* 
  (0.419) (0.379) (0.429) (0.396) (0.432) 
May  2008  0.789* 0.901**  0.832* 0.813* 0.813* 
  (0.411) (0.436) (0.427) (0.421) (0.425) 
Aug  2008  0.341 0.336 0.645 0.639 0.865* 
  (0.416) (0.400) (0.441) (0.437) (0.452) 
Nov  2008  1.133** 1.167** 0.575  0.991** 0.895* 
  (0.450) (0.458) (0.451) (0.454) (0.463) 
Constant  -14.28 -12.83 -13.64 -14.08 -12.85 
  (15.44) (15.38) (15.75) (15.41) (15.25) 
Observations  682 680 682 682 682 
#  Banks  120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared  0.057 0.058 0.047 0.046 0.044   35
Table IV: Takedown volumes by loan categories 
 
The panel regression model with bank fixed-effect is specified as follows: 
constant Effect   Fixed   Time Effect   Fixed Bank  Controls Bank 
) 1 Undrawn ( * Return Stock  ) 1 Takedown (
,
, 3 , 2 , 1 ,
     
      
t i t i
t i t i t i t i Ln NPL Ln   
 
The dependent variable is the log of weekly takedown volume under precommitted credit lines, by different 
loan categories, including, lower risk loans (based on internal credit rating) vs. higher risk loans, long 
relationship borrowers (greater than 1 year) vs. short relationship borrowers, large commitment size 
(greater than $10 million) vs. small lines, and large loans (greater than $0.5 million) vs. small loans.  Bank 
stock returns are measured relative to four weeks ago. A second measure of bank distress is the bank’s 
nonperforming loan ratio about one month ago. Also controlled for are, unused portion of loan 
commitments, equity ratio, core deposit ratio, liquid asset ratio, and return on asset, all measured at about 
one month prior to the loan disbursement. The model is estimated with bank fixed effects and time fixed 
effects.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering of residuals by banks are in parentheses, and ***, 
**, * indicates statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 

















                    
Stock Return  0.00880  0.0228**   -0.00237  0.0231**   -0.00643  0.0221**   0.00486  0.0271*** 
 (0.0101)  (0.0106)   (0.0104)  (0.00886)   (0.00891) (0.00931)   (0.0125)  (0.00891) 
NPL Ratio  -20.20  -51.40*   -23.33**  -49.44**   -1.429  -49.69**   -4.756  -45.96* 
 (13.68)  (27.49)   (11.34)  (23.80)   (10.99)  (25.04)   (12.16)  (24.26) 
Ln  (undrawn)  0.821  1.312   0.909  0.640   -0.0639  0.266   0.904  0.626 
 (0.566)  (1.265)    (0.678)  (0.565)   (1.275)  (0.452)   (0.912)  (0.497) 
Equity  Ratio  9.008  17.66   -10.21  7.164   41.44**  -10.48   19.29  -3.759 
  (14.22)  (21.42)   (15.32)  (9.224)   (19.80)  (12.90)   (20.64)  (9.318) 
Core  Deposit  Ratio  4.218  3.220   5.593  7.175   0.865  8.717   11.49  6.485 
 (6.007)  (7.158)    (6.267)  (6.153)   (5.125)  (6.787)   (7.072)  (5.285) 
Liquid  Asset  Ratio  7.460  -2.392   -0.632  5.209   -0.580  8.807   2.906  4.668 
 (5.755)  (9.089)    (4.419)  (5.912)   (5.383)  (6.359)   (7.606)  (4.533) 
Return  on  Asset  -45.27  -70.34   -40.52  -43.06   3.407  -40.16   0.954  -48.05 
  (44.87)  (50.99)   (37.06)  (33.09)   (26.45)  (33.88)   (24.20)  (31.86) 
Aug  2007  0.927**  0.321   0.581  0.660*   0.102  0.666*   0.986**  0.599 
 (0.410)  (0.394)    (0.374)  (0.373)   (0.311)  (0.363)   (0.432)  (0.370) 
Nov  2007  0.467  0.467   0.230  0.865*   0.143  0.691*   0.721  0.821** 
 (0.445)  (0.479)    (0.452)  (0.458)   (0.445)  (0.417)   (0.586)  (0.403) 
Feb  2008  0.432  0.541   0.666  0.425   0.769  0.411   0.521  0.351 
 (0.437)  (0.597)    (0.505)  (0.417)   (0.551)  (0.402)   (0.617)  (0.410) 
May  2008  0.475  0.289   0.877**  0.865*   0.956*  0.654*   1.181**  0.587 
 (0.383)  (0.420)    (0.427)  (0.445)   (0.505)  (0.389)   (0.514)  (0.403) 
Aug  2008  0.397  0.660   1.257***  0.399   0.961**  0.418   1.039**  0.109 
 (0.422)  (0.621)    (0.475)  (0.423)   (0.480)  (0.440)   (0.522)  (0.416) 
Nov  2008  0.780**  1.005   1.279**  1.056**   0.351  1.127**   1.205*  0.918** 
 (0.388)  (0.681)    (0.532)  (0.464)   (0.531)  (0.467)   (0.696)  (0.445) 
Constant  -12.78  -20.85   -12.80  -9.140   3.514  -1.690   -20.95  -7.482 
  (14.38)  (27.95)   (16.29)  (14.41)   (27.87)  (12.48)   (21.44)  (12.74) 
Observations  654  654   682  682   682  682   682  682 
#  Banks  117  117   120  120   120  120   120  120 
R-squared  0.023  0.050   0.038  0.055   0.024  0.051   0.021  0.059 
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Table V: Takedown volumes in different types of banks 
The panel regression model with bank fixed-effect is specified as follows: 
constant Effect   Fixed   Time Effect   Fixed Bank  Controls Bank 
) 1 Undrawn ( * Return Stock  ) 1 Takedown (
,
, 3 , 2 , 1 ,
     
      
t i t i
t i t i t i t i Ln NPL Ln   
 
The dependent variable is the log of weekly takedown volume under precommitted credit lines. The 
regression are estimated separately for different types of banks: higher core deposit ratio (than 0.59) banks 
vs. lower ratio banks, higher liquidity ratio (than 0.195) banks vs. lower ratio banks, higher equity ratio 
(than 0.095) banks vs. lower ratio banks, and higher total asset (than $8.155 billion) banks vs. smaller total 
asset banks. A bank’s type is decided by the average value of over the whole sample period. Bank stock 
returns are measured relative to four weeks ago. A second measure of bank distress is the bank’s 
nonperforming loan ratio. Also controlled for are, unused portion of loan commitments, equity ratio, core 
deposit ratio, liquid asset ratio, and return on asset, all measured at about one month prior to the loan 
disbursement. The model is estimated with bank fixed effects and time fixed effects.  Robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering of residuals by banks are in parentheses, and ***, **, * indicates statistical 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
 
  (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)   (5)  (6)   (7)  (8) 
















                    
Stock Return  0.0155  0.0316**   0.0187*  0.0333**   0.00818  0.0382***   0.00477  0.0446*** 
 (0.0105)  (0.0126)   (0.00964) (0.0138)   (0.00911)  (0.0139)   (0.00783)  (0.0142) 
NPL Ratio  -55.74**  0.778   9.784  -79.21***   -77.95***  -18.99   -4.257  -50.84* 
 (27.70)  (22.54)   (9.522)  (19.58)   (21.87)  (21.43)   (22.33)  (28.02) 
Ln  (undrawn)  1.126  0.958   0.539  1.685   0.680  1.195   0.803  0.524 
 (1.137)  (0.700)    (0.412)  (1.936)    (0.672) (1.277)   (0.778)  (0.759) 
Equity  Ratio  -26.11  8.703   14.16  6.636   1.262  -8.136   4.720  -1.022 
  (20.46)  (14.72)   (13.28)  (12.34)   (10.86)  (21.10)   (11.34)  (23.38) 
Core Deposit 
Ratio 
3.370  10.21   3.925  12.31   17.42**  2.951   12.33  1.482 
 (6.569)  (8.134)    (5.580)  (10.72)    (8.463) (7.283)   (9.507)  (6.009) 
Liquid Asset 
Ratio 
-6.688 21.93**    13.28*  0.609  -2.445  17.44*   2.475  11.10 
 (6.503)  (10.01)    (7.650)  (9.956)    (5.250) (10.38)   (5.115)  (11.83) 
Return  on  Asset  -4.967  -51.05   -22.48  -49.94   15.42  -68.16   -7.292  -65.85 
  (45.83)  (42.89)   (36.92)  (37.49)   (29.49)  (50.40)   (24.36)  (58.53) 
Aug  2007  0.205  1.039**   0.935*  0.571   0.315  0.924   0.361  0.899 
 (0.511)  (0.454)    (0.483)  (0.536)    (0.393) (0.568)   (0.388)  (0.615) 
Nov  2007  0.157  1.127*   1.140**  0.473   0.440  1.041*   0.267  1.206* 
 (0.609)  (0.566)    (0.550)  (0.565)    (0.488) (0.604)   (0.485)  (0.662) 
Feb  2008  0.446  0.0291   0.257  0.475   0.545  0.235   0.446  -0.00327 
 (0.686)  (0.504)    (0.614)  (0.627)    (0.481) (0.631)   (0.546)  (0.643) 
May  2008  0.499  0.711   0.713  0.758   1.458***  0.132   0.691  0.544 
 (0.539)  (0.571)    (0.475)  (0.533)    (0.538) (0.580)   (0.562)  (0.575) 
Aug  2008  0.0533  0.0839   0.260  0.341   1.117**  -0.459   0.258  -0.00974 
 (0.694)  (0.399)    (0.443)  (0.548)    (0.495) (0.582)   (0.494)  (0.580) 
Nov  2008  0.910  0.550   0.704  1.558***   1.732***  0.462   0.591  0.960* 
 (0.650)  (0.517)    (0.427)  (0.568)    (0.478) (0.559)   (0.540)  (0.551) 
Constant  -11.33  -19.96   -9.170  -31.14   -12.84  -20.33   -12.79  -5.718 
  (23.16)  (19.45)   (10.08)  (45.98)   (18.12)  (28.44)   (21.71)  (17.42) 
Observations  332  350   354  328   350  332   362  320 
#  Banks  60  60   60  60   60  60   60  60 
R-squared  0.096  0.074   0.042  0.127   0.103  0.082   0.032  0.113 
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Table VI: Bank financial conditions do not affect the quantity of newly negotiated 
loans (spot loans, informal credit lines, recently negotiated facilities) 
The panel regression model with bank fixed-effect is specified as follows: 
constant Effect   Fixed   Time Effect   Fixed Bank  Controls Bank 
) 1 Undrawn ( * Return Stock  ) 1 Takedown (
,
, 3 , 2 , 1 ,
     
      
t i t i
t i t i t i t i Ln NPL Ln   
 
Dependent variables are logs of weekly new loan volumes, by different loan types, including spot loans, 
loans disbursed from informal credit lines, loans disbursed from formal credit lines initiated or renewed in 
the same or previous week, and total loan volumes summing all of the above categories as well as loans 
disbursed from formal credit lines. Bank stock returns are measured relative to four weeks ago. A second 
measure of bank distress is the bank’s nonperforming loan ratio. Also controlled for are, unused portion of 
loan commitments, equity ratio, core deposit ratio, liquid asset ratio, and return on asset, all measured at 
about one month prior to the loan disbursement. The model is estimated with bank fixed effects and time 
fixed effects.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering of residuals by banks are in parentheses, and 
***, **, * indicates statistical significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Spot loans  Informal credit 
lines 
New credit lines  Total loans 
     
Stock Return  0.0128 -0.00471  -0.00567  0.00302 
  (0.00860) (0.00881) (0.0135)  (0.00294) 
NPL Ratio  19.10 -8.910  -25.79  -10.84 
  (11.94) (18.87) (17.28) (6.970) 
Ln (total loans)  1.011       
 (1.091)     
Ln (undrawn)    -0.256  0.800  0.240 
  (0.365)  (0.613)  (0.207) 
Equity Ratio  -11.16  11.55  25.65  4.977 
  (25.18) (16.16) (26.94) (5.363) 
Core  Deposit  Ratio  4.779 -2.413  1.637 0.886 
  (10.17) (6.488) (7.270) (1.372) 
Liquid Asset Ratio  -9.151  1.626  2.759  0.744 
  (9.058) (6.319) (6.205) (2.044) 
Return on Asset  -34.28*  -0.719  -22.90  -3.582 
  (20.34) (66.27) (42.90) (6.311) 
Aug 2007  0.221  -0.694  -0.278  0.268** 
  (0.383) (0.525) (0.575) (0.105) 
Nov  2007  -0.194 -0.411 -0.190 0.121 
  (0.479) (0.712) (0.660) (0.100) 
Feb 2008  -0.330  0.0552  0.0954  0.0669 
  (0.417) (0.730) (0.630) (0.136) 
May 2008  -0.412  0.405  0.290  0.323*** 
  (0.568) (0.523) (0.561) (0.118) 
Aug 2008  -1.126*  -0.771*  0.870  0.0852 
  (0.590) (0.421) (0.686) (0.155) 
Nov 2008  -1.457**  -0.127  0.530  0.325* 
  (0.631) (0.621) (0.645) (0.174) 
Constant  -4.904 9.270  -9.633 10.23** 
  (17.68) (8.581) (13.39) (4.222) 
Observations  682 682 682 682 
#  Banks  120 120 120 120 
R-squared  0.024 0.022 0.015 0.042 
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Table VII: Information on individual loans 
 
Panel A: Interest rate and loan size 
The loan level data are from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). Nominal interest rate is the 
compounded annual (360 days) interest rate charged on a loan. Credit spread is the nominal interest rate 
over the yield on treasury securities of similar repricing intervals. Loan size is the value of the loan 
disbursement. Commitment is the size of the credit limit on a credit line facility. 
  
 N  Mean  S.Dev.  25
th Median  75
th 95th 
Precommitted Formal Lines        
Nominal interest rate  177,017  6.24  1.78  4.92  6.00  7.58  9.25 
Credit spread  177,017  3.73  1.14  3.01  3.75  4.34  5.66 
Loan size ($000)  177,017  353  3,122  16  43  148  1,014 
Commitment ($000)  177,017  8,551  235,719  500  2,000  7,000  30,000 
              
New Formal Lines            
Nominal interest rate  12,340  6.67  1.78  5.25  6.50  8.00  9.50 
Credit spread  12,340  4.09  1.28  3.33  3.95  4.83  6.25 
Loan size ($000)  12,340  724  3,485  22  61  225  2,964 
Commitment ($000)  12,340  5,448  113,925  96  500  3,000  20,000 
              
Informal Lines              
Nominal interest rate  11,006  6.54  1.73  5.00  6.50  8.00  9.25 
Credit spread  11,006  3.88  1.12  3.31  3.87  4.47  5.57 
Loan size ($000)  11,006  146  697  13  30  91  450 
Commitment ($000)  11,006  3,460  7,822  400  1,400  4,000  14,286 
              
Spot Loans              
Nominal interest rate  12,491  7.10  1.89  6.00  7.00  8.25  10.25 
Credit spread  12,491  4.19  1.60  3.28  4.04  5.18  6.58 
Loan size ($000)  12,491  974  6,893  12  30  122  2,500 
 
Panel B: Loan characteristics by categories 
 





Credit  Lines 
Informal 
Credit  Lines 
Spot Loans 
Secured  Loans  0.82 0.77 0.90 0.79 
Fixed Rate Loans  0.06  0.18  0.11  0.35 
Maturity > 1 year  0.48  0.53  0.64  0.76 
No stated maturity  0.22  0.15  0.45  0.33 
Non-rated  loans  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.13 
Rating=1  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Rating=2  0.06 0.07 0.06 0.15 
Rating=3  0.33 0.37 0.29 0.42 
Rating=4  0.24 0.26 0.21 0.17 
Rating=5  0.06 0.07 0.10 0.02 
Rating  Missing  0.28 0.19 0.30 0.08 
N  177,017 12,340 11,006 12,491   39
Table VIII: Loan level regressions: Bank financial conditions affect credit spreads 
on newly negotiated loans (spot loans, loans from informal credit lines, loans from 
newly initiated credit lines), but not loans disbursed from precommitted formal 
credit lines 
The regression is specified as follows: 
 
constant Effect   Fixed   Time Controls Bank 
Controls Loan  * * Return Stock 
,
, 2 , 1
    
    
i t i
t i t i NPL Spread  
 
Credit spread (%) is measured as effective nominal interest rates over yields on treasury securities of 
similar repricing intervals.  Loan controls include log of loan size, log of loan commitment size, dummy 
variables for secured loans, for loans with maturity greater than one year, for loan without a stated maturity, 
and for fixed rate loans. Loan risks are controlled for with dummy variables for non-rated loans (in banks 
that do rate loans),  dummy variables for loans with an internal risk rating of 2 through 5, respectively, and 
a dummy variable for loans that are not rated because the banks do not rate loans. Loans with a risk rating 
of 1 are used as the benchmark and a dummy variable for them is not included. Bank performance is 
measured using four-week bank stock return, and non-performing loan ratio one month ago. We further 
control for bank characteristics using financial ratios such as equity ratio, core deposit ratio, liquidity ratio, 
and return on assets. We also control for log of total commercial loans outstanding. Time fixed effects are 
included and all standard errors are adjusted for the clustering of residual by banks.  ***, **, * indicates 
statistical significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Formal lines  New formal lines  Informal lines  Spot loans 
     
Stock  Return  0.00100 0.00213 0.00267 0.00371 
  (0.00258) (0.00352) (0.00416) (0.00673) 
NPL Ratio  -0.377 17.11**  17.07***  13.96** 
  (5.961) (8.505) (6.322) (6.057) 
Ln (Loan)  0.0252  -0.000834  -0.0809***  -0.360*** 
  (0.0252) (0.0250) (0.0149) (0.0318) 
Ln  (Commitment)  -0.323*** -0.242*** -0.268***  
  (0.0317) (0.0299) (0.0394)  
Secured -0.0236 -0.0487 0.133  -0.292 
  (0.0863) (0.0728) (0.0834) (0.242) 
Maturity> 1 yr  0.0944  0.0613  -0.0477  0.414*** 
  (0.0967) (0.100)  (0.0619) (0.135) 
No stated maturity  -0.242  -0.0178  -0.476***  -0.243 
  (0.165) (0.179) (0.107) (0.196) 
Fixed  rate -0.601*** -0.780*** -0.760*** -0.526*** 
  (0.131) (0.102) (0.120) (0.120) 
Non-rated 0.594***  0.641***  -0.316  0.554** 
  (0.207) (0.212) (0.199) (0.226) 
Rating=2 0.163  0.294  0.318**  0.267* 
  (0.216) (0.201) (0.124) (0.150) 
Rating=3 0.472**  0.670*** 0.149  0.683*** 
  (0.221) (0.155) (0.121) (0.117) 
Rating=4  0.462** 0.713***  0.351** 0.595*** 
  (0.211) (0.159) (0.168) (0.183) 
Rating=5 0.919*** 1.109*** 0.402  1.079*** 
  (0.233) (0.180) (0.256) (0.139) 
No rating system  0.305  0.643***  0.445  0.439* 
  (0.188) (0.179) (0.307) (0.236) 
Equity Ratio  -3.283  1.911  5.092**  -3.130 
  (2.495) (3.270) (1.908) (3.629)   40
Core Deposit Ratio  1.181  -0.160  -4.761***  0.825 
  (0.743) (0.524) (1.225) (1.053) 
Liquid  Asset  Ratio  -0.714 -0.253 -0.366 -1.602*** 
  (0.600) (0.718) (1.274) (0.601) 
Return  on  Asset  -5.352 8.243  -0.397 2.004 
  (3.229) (5.703) (6.571) (7.644) 
Ln (total loan)  -0.0689*  -0.0675*  -0.149***  -0.0506 
  (0.0389) (0.0343) (0.0460) (0.0402) 
Aug 2007  -0.109**  -0.158**  0.166  0.00379 
 (0.0419)  (0.0761)  (0.127)  (0.151) 
Nov 2007  0.235***  0.147*  0.297**  0.453*** 
 (0.0456)  (0.0831)  (0.120)  (0.0935) 
Feb  2008 0.243*** 0.0742  -0.100  0.443*** 
 (0.0716)  (0.129)  (0.214)  (0.146) 
May 2008  -0.0335  -0.163  -0.508**  0.248 
 (0.0896)  (0.119)  (0.242)  (0.177) 
Aug 2008  -0.201*  -0.406***  -0.722***  0.00888 
  (0.119) (0.149) (0.205) (0.264) 
Nov 2008  0.537***  0.260  0.0317  0.707*** 
  (0.150) (0.206) (0.165) (0.223) 
Constant 8.631*** 7.522*** 12.85*** 8.170*** 
  (0.950) (0.685) (1.210) (1.348) 
Observations 177,017  12,340  11,006  12,491 
R-squared  0.332 0.273 0.424 0.310 
 